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Abstract  In this paper, we show recent results indicating that using electrical 
noise as information carrier offers outstanding potentials reminding of quantum 
informatics. One example is noise-based computing and logic that shows certain 
similarities to quantum logic. However, due to the lack of the collapse of wave-
function and due to the immediate accessibility of superposition components, the 
use of noise-based and quantum computers will probably be different. Another ex-
ample is secure communications where, out of the unconditional security at ideal-
istic situations, a practical security beyond known quantum solutions can be 
achieved and has been demonstrated. Here the keys to security are the robustness 
of classical information, and the second law of thermodynamics. These offer the 
avoidance of making error statistics and single bit security. It has the potential to 
restrict the practical applications of quantum communicators to the situations 
where no wire can be used but optical communication via fiber or via space is 
possible.  
1. Introduction 
Very recently, it has been shown that thermal noise and its artificial versions 
(Johnson-like noises) can be utilized as an information carrier [1] with peculiar 
properties therefore it may be proper to call this topic Thermal Noise Informatics 
[2]. Thermal Noise Driven Computing, Zero Power Communication, and Totally 
Secure Classical Communication are relevant examples.  
                                                           
1 A short review of earlier results re-edited and expanded, see the references. 
The noise-based logic results are new and still unpublished at the time of submit-
ting this chapter. 
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2. Zero Power and Zero-Quantum Communications, Stealth 
Communications 
Recently, it has been shown [1] that the equilibrium thermal noise in information 
channels can be utilized to carry information. In this case, the transmitter does not 
emit any signal energy into the channel however it only modulates the existing 
noise there. This issue is completely different from the earlier Porod-Landauer de-
bate [3] about the question if communication without net energy cost is possible 
by gaining back the energy spent in the communicator devices. (In our opinion, 
Porod is right, energy-free communication is impossible just like energy-free 
computing, however those debates are irrelevant here). In our system, the noise is 
used as information carrier and no effort is made to restore the energy dissipated 
in the communicator devices. Therefore, this communicator is not energy-free 
communication but it is free of emitted signal energy, except perhaps a negligible 
energy in the order of kT/bit, a presently open problem. 
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Fig. 2.1. Stealth communications. Zero (signal) power classical communication (left) and zero-
quantum quantum communication (right) [1]. 
Zero (signal) power classical communication can utilize the modulation of back-
ground thermal noise in the information channel and zero-quantum quantum 
communication can utilize the modulation of the zero-point fluctuations in the 
quantum channel, see Figure 2.1, [1]. 
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Fig. 2.2. A possible realization of stealth communication with zero power classical communica-
tion or zero-quantum quantum communication utilizing classical thermal noise and zero-point 
quantum fluctuations with frequency bandwidth modulation. Classical or quantum, it depends on 
the upper cutoff frequency fc and the temperature. Classical: hfc  << kT;  quantum:  hfc  >> kT . 
The receiver can be a simple noise spectrum analyzer or just a simple AC voltmeter. 
In [1] some possible realizations were shown. Figure 2.2 shows one of the exam-
ples where the Johnson noise of resistors and bandwidth modulation are used in 
the classical and the quantum limits [1]. In the classical limit, kT >> h / RC , the 
Johnson noise voltage spectrum is: 
  
Su,class ( f ) = 4kT Re Z ( f )[ ]  ,  (2.1) 
and in the quantum limit,   kT << h / RC , the zero point voltage noise spectrum is: 
  
Su,quan ( f ) = 2hf Re Z ( f )[ ]  .  (2.2) 
The contacted impedance Z ( f )  is different in the two positions of the switch be-
cause of the different capacitance values. The receiver can be a simple noise spec-
trum analyzer or just a simple AC voltmeter. 
 
In conclusion, it is possible to execute electronic data communication without in-
jecting signal energy in the information channel. Because this the most invisible 
way of communication with basically background noise in the channel, it is proper 
to call these communications stealth communication. 
3. Noise driven computing 
Because noise turned out to be a special information carrier with low energy den-
sity in the information channel, it is natural to pose the question: can we use it for 
information processing and computing?  
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3.1. Thermal noise driven computing? 
The first question we addressed is a computer with extraordinarily large error rate, 
see Fig. 3.1 which we called “thermal noise driven computer”. At thermal noise 
driven computing [4], an idea further inspired by the fact that the neural signals in 
the brain are noise, certain statistical parameters of an electrical noise, including 
thermal noise, is the information carrier.  
 
The information may be carried by the bandwidth as at the zero power communi-
cation examples above or in other way. To study the minimal energy requirement 
of requirement/dissipation, another specific realization was used, a simple digital 
system with zero threshold voltage, when the thermal noise is equal to or greater 
than the digital signal [4]. Under these conditions, when the digital signal ampli-
tude is less than the variance of the noise, classical digital information is usually 
considered to be zero or useless, see Figure 3.1.  
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Fig. 3.1. Illustration of the range of error probabilities of classical computing and that of the 
thermal noise driven computing. Y axies: bit content/single clock cycle; plot of Shannon's digital 
channel coding theorem. A thermal noise driven computer will supposedly work in that range 
where the information content/ single switching is low, the signal looks like noise and no usual 
classical computer could work. 
We would like to note that in a different class of efforts many notable scientists, 
including John von Neumann [5]; Forshaw and coworkers [6,7]; and Palem and 
coworkers [8,9] have been proposing efficient ways of working with probabilistic 
switches, which are noisy digital logic units with relatively high error probability. 
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For example, Palem and coworkers have pointed out that this may be a way to re-
duce power dissipation [8,9] if we give up our requirement of data accuracy. 
However, though these approaches can be relevant to future developments of 
thermal noise driven computing, they are very different from our present ap-
proach. In a thermal noise driven computer, the voltage in the channel is domi-
nantly noise and the modulation of the statistical properties of this noise carry the 
information. Therefore, the way of extracting the information is not by "error cor-
recting the information" like the efforts mentioned above do but by "decoding the 
information in the noise". The realization example we analyzed is working in the 
regime of huge error probability, p  0.5 , with zero logic threshold voltage and in 
the sub-noise signal amplitude limit; and all these parameters are very unusual.  
 
Even though that at this stage there are more open questions than answers and we 
were are at the moment unable to show a functioning thermal noise driven logical 
circuitry, certain questions can already be answered about it. Estimations were 
given about the information channel capacity and the minimal energy dissipation 
E
1
 given in Energy/bit unit which is given as: 
 = Ps
Cdig
p0.5
=
  ln 2
2
 kT /bit  1.1 bit /kT  (3.1) 
where P
s
 is the power needed to run the sub-noise level digital signal, Cdig
pª 0.5
 
is he information channel capacity of this signal.  
 
The main advantage of such a hypothetical thermal noise driven computer would 
be a potentially improved energy efficiency and an obvious lack of leakage cur-
rent, cross-talk and ground EMI problems due the very low DC voltages. An ap-
parent disadvantage is the large number of extra (redundancy) elements required 
for error reduction [5-7] if we want a Turing machine. 
3.2. Noise-based logic: deterministic, with low error rate 
The thermal noise driven computer with the extraordinary error rate shown above 
is interesting however it is unclear what type of computer it would be. Certainly 
not a Turing machine because Turing machines must operate error-free and error 
correction is hopeless here. In this section, we briefly mention a different solution, 
which excellently fits Turing machines because its error rate can be set arbitrarily 
low. 
 
In noise-based logic [10] the distinct values are represented by independent sto-
chastic processes: independent voltage (or current) noises. The orthogonality of 
these processes provides a natural way to construct binary or multi-valued logic 
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circuitry with arbitrary number N of logic values by using analog circuitry. 
Moreover, the logic values on a single wire can be made a (weighted) superposi-
tion of the N distinct logic values. Fuzzy logic is also naturally represented by a 
two-component superposition within the binary case (N=2). Error propagation and 
accumulation are suppressed. Other relevant advantages are reduced energy dissi-
pation and leakage current problems, and robustness against circuit noise and 
background noises such as 1/f, Johnson, shot and crosstalk noise. Variability prob-
lems are also nonexistent because the logic value is an AC signal. A similar logic 
system can be built with orthogonal sinusoidal signals (different frequency or or-
thogonal phase) however that has an extra 1/N type slowdown compared to the 
noise-based logic system with increasing number of N furthermore it is less robust 
against time delay effects than the noise-based counterpart. 
 
The noise-based logic we have introduced in [10], in its binary working mode, has 
the potential to outperform normal digital circuitry even though it is based on ana-
log circuit elements. Still the most far reaching potential of it maybe the high di-
mensional multi-value logic type working modes provided their mathematical the-
ory is available. 
4. Unconditionally secure classical communication via wire 
4.1 The Kirchhoff-loop-Johnson(-like)-noise cipher 
Recently, a totally secure classical communication scheme, a statistical-physical 
competitor of quantum communicators, was introduced, see Figure 4.1, ([11,12] 
and [2]), the Kirchhoff-Loop-Johnson(-like)-Noise (KLJN) communicator, with 
two identical pairs of resistors and corresponding Johnson(-like) noise voltage 
generators. The KLJN communicators are utilizing the physical properties of an 
idealized Kirchhoff-loop and the statistical physical properties thermal noise 
(Johnson noise). The resistors (low bit = small resistor, high bit = large resistor) 
and their thermal-noise-like voltage generators (thermal noise voltage enhanced 
by a pre-agreed factor) are randomly chosen and connected at each clock period at 
the two sides of the wire channel. A secure bit exchange takes place when the bit 
states at the two line ends are different, which is indicated by an intermediate level 
of the rms noise voltage on the line, or that of the rms current noise in the wire. 
The most attractive properties of the KLJN cipher are related to its security 
[11,12] and to the extraordinary robustness of classical information when com-
pared that to the fragility of quantum information. To provide security against ar-
bitrary types of attacks, the instantaneous currents and voltages are measured at 
both ends by Alice and Bob and they are published and compared. In the idealized 
scheme of the KLJN cipher, the passively observing eavesdropper can extract zero 
bit (zero-bit security) of information and the actively eavesdropping observer can 
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extract at most one bit while getting discovered (zero-bit security) [11]. The sys-
tem has a natural zero-bit security against the man-in-the-middle attack which is a 
unique property among secure communicators [13], see Figure 4.2. The KLJN 
system has recently became network-ready [14]. This new property opens a large 
scale of practical applications because the KLJN cipher can be installed as a com-
puter card [14], similarly to ethernet network cards. Other practical advantages 
compared to quantum communicators are the high speed, resistance against dust, 
vibrations, temperature gradients, and the low price [11]. It has been shown [15] 
that the KJLN communicator may use currently used wire lines, such as power 
lines, phone lines, internet wire lines by utilizing proper filtering methods. 
 
 
 
Fig. 4.1. The outline of the KLJN communicator. The practical line can generally be represented 
by distributed resistors and capacitors; however with the proper choice of the cable, the driving 
elements (resistors and capacitance killer, see below), and the frequency range, it behaves as a 
simple resistor. The instantaneous current and voltage data are measured and compared at the 
two ends and, in the case of deviance; the eavesdropping alarm goes on and the currently ex-
changed bit is not used. The low-pass line filters are necessary to protect against out-of-alarm-
frequency-band breaking attempts and false alarms due to parasite transients. False alarms would 
occur due to any wave effect (transient or propagation effects), illegal frequency components or 
external disturbance of the current-voltage-balance in the wire. 
The fully protected communicator is shown in Fig. 4.3. The fact that classical in-
formation is robust and can be monitored continuously provides unconditional se-
curity even against any invasive attacks. 
 
Concerning the theoretical security of the KLJN system, the basic rule of any 
physical secure communication holds here, too: If you compromise it you lose it. 
Though there have been several attempts to break in the KJLN line, so far, no pro-
posed method has been able to challenge the total security of the idealized KLJN 
system. All these breaking attempts have used various assumptions directly violat-
ing the basic model of the idealized KLJN method. These assumptions are as fol-
lows:  
 
i. Allowing non-negligible wire resistance (Bergou [12], Scheuer and Yariv [16]). 
For the evaluation of this claim at practical conditions, see the response in [17]. 
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Fig. 4.2. An example for the man-at-the-middle-attack by using resistors with the same values 
and noise voltage generators with the same parameters as those of the sender and the receiver 
[13]. In the two separate loops the current noises are totally independent thus the attack is imme-
diately discovered within a fraction of the clock duration. Zero bit can be extracted and the alarm 
goes on. The man-in-the-middle-attack is one of the weakest type of attacks against the KLJN 
cipher. This property is unique among known communicators. 
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Fig. 4.3. The fully protected theoretical KLJN scheme with unconditional security against pas-
sive and active eavesdropping [11]. Eve may actively try to extract information by injecting a 
current at the middle. However, constantly monitoring, broadcasting and comparing the current 
and voltage values at the two ends uncover the eavesdropping and she can extract no bit without 
setting on the alarm.  
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ii. Allowing high-enough bandwidth for wave (transient propagation) effects 
(Scheuer and Yariv [16]). This possibility has been explicitly excluded since the 
original article [11]. For further refusal of this claim, see the response in [17].  
 
Moreover, and this is the most direct practical argument, in this case the standard 
current and voltage protection of the KLJN system would immediately alarm and 
shut down the communication because the existence of transient and wave effects 
per-definition yield different instantaneous current and/or voltage values at the 
two ends. 
iii. Assuming inaccuracy of (noise) temperatures (Hao [18]). For the theoretical 
refusal of this claim, see [19]. 
 
iv. Utilizing practical inaccuracy of resistors (Kish [19]). For the mathematical 
evaluation of this claim at practical conditions, see there [19].  
 
Let us here consider an analogy in the field of quantum communication. Though 
all the practical quantum communicators suffer from the inability of producing to-
tally single-photon output and this fact is unavoidably compromising the security 
of practical quantum communicators, we do not say that the ideal-
ized/mathematical quantum communicator schemes are insecure. In discussing the 
unconditional security of idealized quantum communication schemes, we suppose 
that single-photon sources do exist, which is a similar though more difficult claim 
than to assume the existence of zero wire resistance (c.f. superconductors), and 
then we conclude that the quantum system is therefore unconditionally secure, at 
least conceptually. Therefore the practical claim that idealized single-photon 
source does not exists cannot compromise the claim about the security of an ideal-
ized, conceptual quantum communicator. On the other hand, as soon as the secu-
rity of a practical communicator system is discussed, the aspects non-ideal sin-
gle-photon sources, optical fiber absorption, etc, for quantum communicators and 
similarly the aspects (i-iv) listed above for the KLJN systems cannot be neglected 
any more and the practical design must keep these effects under control. 
 
The realized KLJN communicator pair shows excellent performance, see Table 
4.1, and Fig. 4.4, through a model-line with communication ranges orders of mag-
nitude beyond the ranges of known direct quantum communication channels [21]. 
The study indicates that the most important type of security leak, which will need 
most of resources to control, is the Bergou-Scheuer-Yariv type wire resistance ef-
fect [12,16,17]; and the rest of the practical security compromises can be ne-
glected, such as the transient/wave arguments of Scheuer-Yariv [16,17], the noise 
strength argument of Hao [18] and the resistor inaccuracy argument of Kish [19]. 
The results indicate yet unrivalled fidelity and security levels among existing 
physical secure communicators and there are straightforward ways to further im-
prove security, fidelity and range, if it is necessary and resources are available, 
such as thicker cable, etc. Asca comparison, we should keep in mind that the secu-
rity claims of quantum communicators are usually theoretical because of the ex-
pensive nature of relevant breaking tests, while in our practical system we have 
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been able to carry out all the security tests against all the currently known ways of 
breaking attempts. 
 
 
 
TYPE OF BREAKING 
 
MEASURED NUMBER, OR 
RATIO, OF EAVESDROPPABLE 
BITS WITHOUT SETTING ON 
THE CURRENT-VOLTAGE 
ALARM (TESTED THROUGH 
74497 BITS) 
 
 
REMARKS 
 
 
BSchY (i) [12,16] attack in 
the present KLJN system 
 
 
0.19% 
0.00000019% at 10 times 
thicker wire (theoretical ex-
trapolation). Arbitrarily can 
be enhanced by privacy am-
plification [20,21]; the price 
is slowing down. 
 
Hao (iii) [16] attack in the 
present KLJN system 
 
 
 
Zero bit 
Below the statistical inaccu-
racy. Considering the 12 bit 
effective resolution of noise 
generation accuracy, it is 
theoretically: <10
-10
 
 
Kish (iv) [17] attack utilizing 
resistor inaccuracies in the 
present KLJN system 
 
 
 
Zero bit 
 
Below statistical inaccuracy. 
Theoretically, when pessimis-
tically supposing 1% resis-
tance inaccuracy:  <0.01% 
Current pulse injection (Kish) 
[9] in the present KLJN sys-
tem. 
 
Zero bit 
One bit can be extracted 
while the alarm goes on thus 
the bit cannot be used. 
Table 4.2. Practical security of the built KLJN cipher [20]. 
 
 
Fig. 4.4. The realized KLJN network unit with a pair of KLJN communicators [7]. The computer 
chip version can be much simpler because of the very short cable distances in the computer pro-
viding idealistic conditions to approach the theoretical limits of performance. 
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4.2 Unconditionally secure computers and other hardware 
In the case of the need of extraordinary security, Kirchhoff-loop-Johnson-(like)-
noise ciphers can easily be integrated on existing types of digital chips in order to 
provide secure data communication between hardware processors, memory chips, 
hard disks and other units within a computer or other data processor system, see 
Fig. 4.5 [22]. This looks like a hopeless goal to do with today’s bulky quantum 
communicators however it is a trivial task for silicon chip technology. The secure 
key exchange can take place at the very first run and the system can renew the key 
later at random times with an authenticated fashion to prohibit man-in-the-middle 
attack. The key can be stored in flash memories within the communicating chip 
units at hidden random addresses among other random bits that are continuously 
generated by the secure line but are never actually used. Thus, even if the system 
is disassembled, and the eavesdropper can have direct access to the communica-
tion lines between the units, or even if she is trying to use a man-in-the-middle at-
tack, no information can be extracted. The only way to break the code is to learn 
the chip structure, to understand the machine code program and to read out the in-
formation during running by accessing the proper internal ports of the working 
chips. However such an attack needs extraordinary resources and even that can be 
prohibited by a password lockout. The unconditional security of commercial algo-
rithms against piracy can be provided in a similar way. 
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Fig. 4.5. Example for securing a subsystem of a PCU, a RAM and two hard drives. Solid arrows: 
KLJN connections; Block arrows: classical data bus connections. Each unit has 3 KLJN commu-
nicators integrated on their chip. The required number of KLJN units/chip is N-1 when N chip 
gets connected securely. 
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